

## Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow

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## #whoami

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### **Security Trainer**

### **TopherTimzen.com**





## Overview

### +.NET?

### +Runtime Attacks

### +Modify Control Flow

### +Machine Code Editing

### +Managed Heap



## Why are we Here?



### **Use .NET to attack**

### **Using Objects on the Heap**



## **CLR Attacks**

Controlling the Common Language Runtime Accessing raw objects on Managed Heap

**Manipulate AppDomains** 

- Controlling all Loaded Code
- Controlling Just-In-Time Compilation



## Attack With ASM

### **Manipulate Resources**

### Attack methods at ASM level

### **Alter application control flow**



## Runtime

**.NET Process** CLR (2.0/4.0) & AppDomains Assemblies (.EXE and .DLL(s)) Objects **Properties Fields Instance Methods** Classes **Methods** Logic



# The Tools **Gray Frost** 8 **Gray Storm**





# Gray Frost





# **Gray Frost**

Payload delivery system C++ .NET CLR Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload 2 Rounds

- +GrayFrostCpp
- +GrayFrostCSharp
  - C# Payload































#### GrayFrostCpp





#### GrayFrostCSharp
























#### GrayFrostCpp











#### GrayFrostCpp











#### GrayFrostCpp





#### GrayFrostCSharp



#### GrayFrostCpp





#### GrayFrostCSharp



#### GrayFrostCpp











#### GrayFrostCpp





#### GrayFrostCSharp



#### GrayFrostCpp





#### GrayFrostCSharp



# Gray Storm





# **Gray Storm**

**Reconnaissance and In-memory attack** payload Features +Attacking the .NET JIT +Attacking .NET at the ASM level +ASM and Metasploit payloads +Utilize objects on the Managed Heap



## **Gray Storm Usage**



# **Controlling the JIT**


Method Tables contain address of JIT stub for a class's methods.

**During JIT the Method Table is referenced** 

We can control the address Lives after Garbage Collection




# **Controlling the JIT**





# **Controlling the JIT**





# **Control Flow Attacks**

.NET uses far and relative calls +0xE8; Call [imm] + 0xFF 0x15; Call dword segmentRegister[imm]

relCall = dstAddress - (currentLocation+ lenOfCall)



# ASM Payloads

#### Address of a method known through Reflection

#### **Overwrite method logic with new ASM**

**Steal stack parameters** 

**Change events** 




# ASM Payloads

**Change return TRUE to return FALSE** + Password validation +Key & Licensing validation +SQL Sanitization **Destroy security Mechanisms Overwrite** logic **Update Mechanisms** 



# **ASM Payloads**



0x55 push ebp 0x8B mov ebp , esp 0x57 push edi 0x56 push esi 0x53 push ebx 0x83 sub esp , 00000014h 0x89 mov dword [ebp-14h], ecx 0x89 mov dword [ebp-18h], edx [snip] 0x8B mov ecx , esi 0xE8 call 53A7CE80h 0x85 test edi , edi 0xF95 setne al ØxFB6 movzx eax , al 0x8D lea esp , dword [ebp-0Ch] 0x5B pop ebx 0x5E pop esi 0x5F pop edi 0x5D pop ebp 0xC3 ret



## **ASM Payloads**

Metasploit

Hand Rolled

**Portable Environment Block (PEB) changes** 



## **Portable Environment Block**

0:00	)5> !peb		
PEB	at 7efde000		
	InheritedAddressSpace:	No	
	ReadImageFileExecOptions	No	
	BeingDebugged:	Yes	
	ImageBaseAddress:	012 <b>b</b> 0000	
	Ldr	77 <b>b</b> 40200	
	Ldr.Initialized:	Yes	
	Ldr.InInitializationOrderModuleList: 00273a80 .		00273a80 . 00301d48
	Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList	::	002739e0 . 00301d38
	Ldr.InMemoryOrderModuleL:	.st:	002739e8 . 00301d40
	Base TimeStamp		Module
	12b0000 54f4a118 Ma	02 09:42:48	<pre>3 2015 C:\\Users\\Blob\\DllInjector.exe</pre>
	77a40000 521ea8e7 Au	; <mark>28 18:</mark> 50:31	L 2013 C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ntdll.dll
	73a10000 4b90752b Mar	04 19:06:19	9 2010 C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\MSCOREE.DLL
	75fc0000 53159a85 Mai	04 01:19:01	<pre>L 2014 C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\KERNEL32.dll</pre>

## **Object Hunting in Memory**



## Managed Heap

#### **Storage point for .NET Objects**

New reference objects added to heap

Garbage Collector removes dead objects



## Managed Heap

#### **Storage point for .NET Objects**

New reference objects added to heap

Garbage Collector removes dead objects

Let's manipulate it!



## **Object Hunting in Memory**

**Objects are IntPtrs Point to Object Instance on Managed Heap** All instantiated objects of the same class share the same Method Table

Win



## Finding Objects at Runtime

- i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap
- ii. Signature instantiated type
- iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers
- iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
- v. ????
- vi. PROFIT



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## **Construct an Object**


Use Reflection to invoke a constructor

Can instantiate any object


If a constructor takes other objects, nullify them

DEF CON


https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/010b19fdbde77f251414
















DEF CON

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## Signature instantiated type

## Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type.

0:009> dd 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 00774828 0000038c 0000001 00000000

(x86) Bytes 0-3 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 4-7 in MT is Instance Size



## Signature instantiated type

## Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type.

0:008> dd 0000000024e9fe8 0000000`0286b8e0 ea774828 000007fe

(x64) Bytes 0-7 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 8-11 in MT is Instance Size



## Finding Objects at Runtime

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## Scan Managed Heap

Scan down incrementing by size of object

Scan linearly up to top of heap

Compare object's Method Table to the reference

If they match, get IntPtr address of object




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## Convert object ptr -> raw obj


```
public static object GetInstance(IntPtr ptrIN)
{
    object refer = ptrIN.GetType();
    IntPtr pointer = ptrIN;
    unsafe
    {
        *(&pointer - 1) = *(&pointer);
    }
    return refer;
}
```





https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/1da2b0aab6245ed1c27b

## Convert object ptr -> raw obj





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## Convert object ptr -> raw obj

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    IntPtr pointer = ptrIN;
    unsafe
    {
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}
```





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## PROFIT





## **Superpowers and Things?**

#### +Change Keys

+Change Fields / Properties

+Call Methods +With arguments!



## Automation



### Automation

# GrayFrost can be used with automated payloads

GrayKernel>autoFrost.py Usage: autoFrost.py <C# Payload.exe> <GrayFrost.sln file>

GrayKernel>autoFrost.py autoThink.exe grayfrost\\GrayFrost.sln

- [+] Building Payload into embeddable array
- [+] Writing GrayFrostCSharp\\payload.cs
- [+] Building GrayFrostCSharp
- [+] Writing Slate.h
- [+] Building GrayFrost{32,64}.dll
- [+] GrayFrost finished building



## **Constructing Attack Chains**



### How to construct attack chains

#### Gray Wolf / IL Decompiler

- Find Methods, Fields & Properties of interest
- Locate meaningful objects
- Discover high level control flow

#### Gray Storm "Debugging" functionality

 Breakpoint at constructors or methods from Method Pointers

DEF CON

Use with WinDbg

#### Utilize DLL Hijacking!

## Hybrid .NET/ASM Attacks

### +Hybrid C#/ASM code in .NET

### +Encrypting .NET payloads and unwinding

## +Encrypting ASM Payloads



## Payload System

C# is easy

# Can use Gray Frost in any application

Low and High level gap is easy



# **.NET Hacking Space**

#### Small

### Few tools Mostly hacking WoW Lots of PowerShell

### Previous DEF CON talks DEF CON 18 & 19 - Jon McCoy



## Conclusion

 Arbitrary .NET applications can be injected and changed New .NET attack possibilities New tools that support automation Get Gray Frost and Storm github.com/graykernel



## **Questions?**

#### **Contact Me**

- +<u>@TTimzen</u>
- <u>https://www.tophertimzen.com</u>

#### **Get Gray Frost and Storm**

+github.com/graykernel

#### White Papers

- + Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow
- + Acquiring .NET Objects from the Managed Heap

