

Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow

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Overview

+.NET?

+Runtime Attacks

+Modify Control Flow

+Machine Code Editing

+Managed Heap



Why are we Here?



Use .NET to attack

Using Objects on the Heap



CLR Attacks

Controlling the Common Language Runtime Accessing raw objects on Managed Heap

Manipulate AppDomains

- Controlling all Loaded Code
- Controlling Just-In-Time Compilation



Attack With ASM

Manipulate Resources

Attack methods at ASM level

Alter application control flow



Runtime

.NET Process CLR (2.0/4.0) & AppDomains Assemblies (.EXE and .DLL(s)) Objects **Properties Fields Instance Methods** Classes **Methods** Logic



The Tools **Gray Frost** 8 **Gray Storm**





Gray Frost





Gray Frost

Payload delivery system C++ .NET CLR Bootstrapper Creates or injects 4.0 runtime Capability to pivot into 2.0 runtime Contains raw payload 2 Rounds

- +GrayFrostCpp
- +GrayFrostCSharp
 - C# Payload































GrayFrostCpp





GrayFrostCSharp

























GrayFrostCpp











GrayFrostCpp











GrayFrostCpp





GrayFrostCSharp



GrayFrostCpp





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GrayFrostCpp





GrayFrostCSharp



GrayFrostCpp





GrayFrostCSharp



Gray Storm





Gray Storm

Reconnaissance and In-memory attack payload Features +Attacking the .NET JIT +Attacking .NET at the ASM level +ASM and Metasploit payloads +Utilize objects on the Managed Heap



Gray Storm Usage



Controlling the JIT


Method Tables contain address of JIT stub for a class's methods.

During JIT the Method Table is referenced

We can control the address Lives after Garbage Collection




Controlling the JIT





Controlling the JIT





Control Flow Attacks

.NET uses far and relative calls +0xE8; Call [imm] + 0xFF 0x15; Call dword segmentRegister[imm]

relCall = dstAddress - (currentLocation+ lenOfCall)



ASM Payloads

Address of a method known through Reflection

Overwrite method logic with new ASM

Steal stack parameters

Change events




ASM Payloads

Change return TRUE to return FALSE + Password validation +Key & Licensing validation +SQL Sanitization **Destroy security Mechanisms Overwrite** logic **Update Mechanisms**



ASM Payloads



0x55 push ebp 0x8B mov ebp , esp 0x57 push edi 0x56 push esi 0x53 push ebx 0x83 sub esp , 00000014h 0x89 mov dword [ebp-14h], ecx 0x89 mov dword [ebp-18h], edx [snip] 0x8B mov ecx , esi 0xE8 call 53A7CE80h 0x85 test edi , edi 0xF95 setne al ØxFB6 movzx eax , al 0x8D lea esp , dword [ebp-0Ch] 0x5B pop ebx 0x5E pop esi 0x5F pop edi 0x5D pop ebp 0xC3 ret



ASM Payloads

Metasploit

Hand Rolled

Portable Environment Block (PEB) changes



Portable Environment Block

0:00)5> !peb		
PEB	at 7efde000		
	InheritedAddressSpace:	No	
	ReadImageFileExecOptions	No	
	BeingDebugged:	Yes	
	ImageBaseAddress:	012 b 0000	
	Ldr	77 b 40200	
	Ldr.Initialized:	Yes	
	Ldr.InInitializationOrderModuleList: 00273a80 .		00273a80 . 00301d48
	Ldr.InLoadOrderModuleList	::	002739e0 . 00301d38
	Ldr.InMemoryOrderModuleL:	.st:	002739e8 . 00301d40
	Base TimeStamp		Module
	12b0000 54f4a118 Ma	02 09:42:48	<pre>3 2015 C:\\Users\\Blob\\DllInjector.exe</pre>
	77a40000 521ea8e7 Au	; <mark>28 18:</mark> 50:31	L 2013 C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ntdll.dll
	73a10000 4b90752b Mar	04 19:06:19	9 2010 C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\MSCOREE.DLL
	75fc0000 53159a85 Mai	04 01:19:01	<pre>L 2014 C:\\Windows\\syswow64\\KERNEL32.dll</pre>

Object Hunting in Memory



Managed Heap

Storage point for .NET Objects

New reference objects added to heap

Garbage Collector removes dead objects



Managed Heap

Storage point for .NET Objects

New reference objects added to heap

Garbage Collector removes dead objects

Let's manipulate it!



Object Hunting in Memory

Objects are IntPtrs Point to Object Instance on Managed Heap All instantiated objects of the same class share the same Method Table

Win



Finding Objects at Runtime

- i. Construct an object and find location of Managed Heap
- ii. Signature instantiated type
- iii. Scan Managed Heap for object pointers
- iv. Convert object pointers to raw objects
- v. ????
- vi. PROFIT



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Construct an Object


Use Reflection to invoke a constructor

Can instantiate any object


If a constructor takes other objects, nullify them

DEF CON


https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/010b19fdbde77f251414
















DEF CON

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Signature instantiated type

Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type.

0:009> dd 024e9fe8 024e9fe8 00774828 0000038c 0000001 00000000

(x86) Bytes 0-3 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 4-7 in MT is Instance Size



Signature instantiated type

Object Instances contain a Method Table pointer to their corresponding type.

0:008> dd 0000000024e9fe8 0000000`0286b8e0 ea774828 000007fe

(x64) Bytes 0-7 are the Method Table (MT) Bytes 8-11 in MT is Instance Size



Finding Objects at Runtime

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Scan Managed Heap

Scan down incrementing by size of object

Scan linearly up to top of heap

Compare object's Method Table to the reference

If they match, get IntPtr address of object




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Convert object ptr -> raw obj


```
public static object GetInstance(IntPtr ptrIN)
{
    object refer = ptrIN.GetType();
    IntPtr pointer = ptrIN;
    unsafe
    {
        *(&pointer - 1) = *(&pointer);
    }
    return refer;
}
```





https://gist.github.com/tophertimzen/1da2b0aab6245ed1c27b

Convert object ptr -> raw obj





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Convert object ptr -> raw obj

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    IntPtr pointer = ptrIN;
    unsafe
    {
        *(&pointer - 1) = *(&pointer);
    }
    return refer;
}
```






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Finding Objects at Runtime

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- vi. PROFIT









PROFIT





Superpowers and Things?

+Change Keys

+Change Fields / Properties

+Call Methods +With arguments!



Automation



Automation

GrayFrost can be used with automated payloads

GrayKernel>autoFrost.py Usage: autoFrost.py <C# Payload.exe> <GrayFrost.sln file>

GrayKernel>autoFrost.py autoThink.exe grayfrost\\GrayFrost.sln

- [+] Building Payload into embeddable array
- [+] Writing GrayFrostCSharp\\payload.cs
- [+] Building GrayFrostCSharp
- [+] Writing Slate.h
- [+] Building GrayFrost{32,64}.dll
- [+] GrayFrost finished building



Constructing Attack Chains



How to construct attack chains

Gray Wolf / IL Decompiler

- Find Methods, Fields & Properties of interest
- Locate meaningful objects
- Discover high level control flow

Gray Storm "Debugging" functionality

 Breakpoint at constructors or methods from Method Pointers

DEF CON

Use with WinDbg

Utilize DLL Hijacking!

Hybrid .NET/ASM Attacks

+Hybrid C#/ASM code in .NET

+Encrypting .NET payloads and unwinding

+Encrypting ASM Payloads



Payload System

C# is easy

Can use Gray Frost in any application

Low and High level gap is easy



.NET Hacking Space

Small

Few tools Mostly hacking WoW Lots of PowerShell

Previous DEF CON talks DEF CON 18 & 19 - Jon McCoy



Conclusion

 Arbitrary .NET applications can be injected and changed New .NET attack possibilities New tools that support automation Get Gray Frost and Storm github.com/graykernel



Questions?

Contact Me

- +<u>@TTimzen</u>
- <u>https://www.tophertimzen.com</u>

Get Gray Frost and Storm

+github.com/graykernel

White Papers

- + Hijacking Arbitrary .NET Application Control Flow
- + Acquiring .NET Objects from the Managed Heap

